Fixture only — no vendor call. This record is self-reported and unsigned. A BOUND verdict means the published record is internally consistent and the act matched its declared threshold. It does not mean the decision was correct, the confidence was calibrated, the vendor returned this value, or that the set is complete. See the spec, §5.
## §5 The attestation gap — what this does NOT prove
The verifier reads records. It does not call the vendor and does not re-run any
decision. Therefore:
- It does **not** claim the decision was correct.
- It does **not** claim the confidence was well-calibrated.
- It does **not** claim the vendor actually returned this value.
- It does **not** claim the threshold was declared *before* the act. `ts` is
self-asserted; §3 and ATTACK_C cover this.
- It does **not** check `state_digest` against any state — a stranger has no
copy of the state (§2).
A caller who rewrites their own record *consistently* — changing the confidence
or the threshold and re-sealing the hash — produces a record that verifies
`BOUND`. **ATTACK B and ATTACK C in the fixture do exactly this and are expected
to pass.** That is the honest limit of a self-reported record, not a defect in
the verifier.
Two further limits, of the same class, found by independent review and confirmed
against the fixture. Both are more damaging than the three above and are stated
here rather than discovered later:
Closing the vendor gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor
(`vendor_attestation`). Until then, `attestation_gap` is printed on every run.
Any claim that this record proves a decision was *right* is false by structure.
Any claim that a `BOUND` set is a *complete* account of what happened is false
by structure too, until §5.2 is closed.
SPEC §5.1 — event_hash carries no authorship
**§5.1 — `event_hash` carries no authorship.** It is an unkeyed digest: no
secret, no signature, no credential. It detects *lazy* tampering — an edit that
forgets to re-seal — and nothing else. Anyone can mint a fresh `BOUND` record
set from nothing, with no access to the recorder. An independent reviewer did
exactly that from this spec alone. The seal proves internal consistency, never
origin. Closing this requires signing keys, not hashing.
SPEC §5.2 — Selective omission is undetectable
**§5.2 — Selective omission is undetectable.** There is no completeness
requirement, no per-set root, no sequence number, and no chaining across a
record set. A decision cited by no act yields no fault (§4). So a recorder who
simply **does not publish** the acts that would fault produces a perfectly
`BOUND` set. **ATTACK D in the fixture demonstrates this**: it takes CASE_3,
which faults `THRESHOLD_ACT_MISMATCH`, drops the act, forges nothing, breaks no
hash — and verifies `BOUND`. A stranger holding the published set cannot tell
anything is missing. This is why §1 is scoped to *published* records. Closing it
requires an append-only medium or a periodic set root, not a better verifier.
pk-decision-canon-v1 canonical string
Domain tag pk-decision-canon-v1 prefixed into the digest. Algorithm is jcs-rfc8785 restricted to integers. Selection is display-only.
declared eeaead30f928b5bbfad51053ba4c57b393238ed46844be6dcd5f74a47230d230
recomputed eeaead30f928b5bbfad51053ba4c57b393238ed46844be6dcd5f74a47230d230
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "BOUND",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
CASE_2 — below threshold, withheld
BOUND
Published confidence is below the declared acting threshold, and the act was WITHHELD.
declared 95ba3b138086a651f4c9a3af39f6ca9aa959231cce707228af68c619549dd4e0
recomputed 95ba3b138086a651f4c9a3af39f6ca9aa959231cce707228af68c619549dd4e0
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "BOUND",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
CASE_3 — below threshold, acted anyway
FAULT
Published confidence is below the declared acting threshold, and the act was TAKEN anyway.
declared ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
recomputed ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "FAULT",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [
{
"event_id": "A3",
"code": "THRESHOLD_ACT_MISMATCH",
"detail": "confidence 520000ppm vs declared threshold 900000ppm => expected WITHHELD, record says TAKEN"
}
],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
CASE_4 — no threshold declared
FAULT
The decision never declared an acting threshold, so the published act cannot be adjudicated.
declared 2e356afbc557748249c9aa5ece4a9419892fa31b0d3b9d3845e0cf1434a21126
recomputed 2e356afbc557748249c9aa5ece4a9419892fa31b0d3b9d3845e0cf1434a21126
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "FAULT",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [
{
"event_id": "D4",
"code": "THRESHOLD_ABSENT",
"detail": "no acting threshold declared before the decision; act cannot be adjudicated"
}
],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
ATTACK_A — confidence tampered, stale hash
FAULT
Confidence rewritten after sealing, hash left unchanged. Lazy tamper the unkeyed digest can see.
declared ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
recomputed ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "BOUND",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
ATTACK_C — threshold retro-fitted, re-sealed
BOUND
Declared threshold rewritten downward and the hash re-sealed. Internally consistent rewrite; expected BOUND (SPEC §5).
declared ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
recomputed ec1b6feb24ebf38febcab4d5678dfd9b6622937df63a9cc5ea74088972721a13
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "BOUND",
"events_read": 2,
"acts_adjudicated": 1,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}
ATTACK_D — faulting act omitted
BOUND
CASE_3 decision published without the contradicting act. Selective omission; expected BOUND (SPEC §5.2).
declared 4604e5d703a25ce7a8af44ef8b7f27b6557f74015a3428d1eb9c361f9dd0fc67
recomputed 4604e5d703a25ce7a8af44ef8b7f27b6557f74015a3428d1eb9c361f9dd0fc67
hashes match
VerifyResult
{
"verdict": "BOUND",
"events_read": 1,
"acts_adjudicated": 0,
"acts_excluded": 0,
"faults": [],
"attestation_gap": "One or more decisions carry no vendor attestation. The verifier confirms the record is internally consistent and that the act matched the declared threshold. It CANNOT confirm the vendor actually returned this value or this confidence. Closing that gap requires a signed response from the decision vendor."
}